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IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY ON MILITANCY IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME IN DELTA STATE (2009-2015)

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ABSTRACT

The Federal Government of Nigeria introduced the policy of amnesty to the militants in south-south Nigeria as a solution to insecurity and wanton destruction of lives and properties, especially on critical infrastructures of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. This article, however, assessed the impact of Presidential Amnesty on security challenges in the Niger Delta. Utilizing Frustration Aggression theory, the paper argued that the long-accumulated frustrations of the people of Delta rising from the long-time neglect and underdevelopment of the State by various regimes and administrations have led to continuous agitations and violence in the State. The Amnesty programme was oriented towards enhancing the security situation in the Stateto increase crude oil production. Employing qualitative methods and relying mainly on primary and secondarysources, relevant data were generated and analyzed using thematic content analyses.The study argues that a connection exists between the Amnesty Programme, national security, and Nigeria's crude oil production rise. Based on the findings, it is recommended that the federal government should promptly and thoroughly address the fundamental economic and social issues in Delta State, specifically, and the Niger Delta region as a whole, to avert a recurrence of the crisis.

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Introduction

Prior to the advent of commercial oil production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 1958, the region was essentially a pristine environment that supported substantial subsistence resources for the mostly active population. The region accounted for much of Nigeria's commercial fisheries industry (Afinotan, 2009). For centuries, the people of the Niger Delta were content to engage in farming, fishing, and other endeavors like pottery, mat-making, and hunting, unaware that underneath their soil was one of nature's most prized mineral resources.

Crude oil was discovered in the Niger Delta over fifty years ago, with the discovery of Oil in Otuakeme, Otokopiri clan near Oloibiri in 1956 by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Aaron, 2010). Oil has since become the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, contributing over 90 percent of the government's foreign exchange earnings. Surprisingly, the trajectory of constitutional development, socio-economic development, and class formation have been massively influenced and dictated by the politics of Oil (Owugah, 1999). While the Nigerian State may see the availability of crude resources as a 'blessing' and a source of pre-eminence in the global marketplace, the communities where this crude resource is endowed see it as a 'curse.'

The massive exploitation of crude oil creates serious developmental, social, and environmental problems that the Nigerian State and the collaborative oil giants have neglected for a long time (Omotola, 2006). Lamenting about this State of affairs, Owugah (1999) observes that "the oil which brought so much wealth to the nation and those in power, brought much poverty, disease, death, loss of livelihood, to the people of the oil-bearing areas."

After decades of environmental abuse and human degradation coupled with unfulfilled promises of redress on the part of the State and Transnational oil companies, the agitations of the Niger Deltans have taken a violent and militant dimension. These militant activities have gravely impactedthe national economy and security, thus prompting the State to launch military attacks on the region. Intermittently, such military responses have done little to curtail the militant agitation in the Niger Delta, and the Federal government itself is far from winning the war (Ikejiani, 2007).

The battle for local sovereignty over Nigeria's oil took on a more violent aspect in 2006 with the formation of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a pan-Niger Delta paramilitary group. Other groups also arose in the Niger Delta, in addition to MEND, which seems to have expressed complaints about environmental insecurity and the socio-economic marginalization of the Niger Delta people. It seems that some of these groups were motivated more by crime and criminality than by liberation philosophy. These organizations' actions presented a

severe security risk to Nigeria's oil belt (Aaron, 2010).

One of the first armed activities that emerged from the oil-rich region of Nigeria, ranging from the Boro-led Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) in 1966, the Ken-Saro-Wiwa-led Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1992, the Aleibiri Demonstration (AD) in 1997, the Kaiama Declaration (KD) in 1998, the Odi Massacre (OM) in 1999, the Asari-Dokubo-led Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in 2004, Tom Ateke-led Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and several other militant groups emerged as affront to the giants MNCs and the Nigerian State (Eseduwo, 2008).

The State of crisis in the Gbaramatu territory to the South-west of Warri, Ogulagha Kingdom in Burutu Local Government area is dire and escalating. Since 1997, these oil-rich communities of Delta State have been embroiled in political violence. The decade-old crisis has claimed many lives and rendered more than 30,000 homeless (including internally displaced persons). The subsequent loss of revenue to the federal government and the derivation to the oil-producing states of Nigeria totaled billions of dollars. Since early 2006, attacks on oil facilities and the abduction of foreign oil workers by militants have cut down drastically the nation's daily oil production. This crisis is the direct consequence of endemic poverty in these oil-bearing communities of the Delta, lack of socio-economic development, militarization of the oil-bearing communities, lack of stake/participation in the oil industry by oil-bearing communities, high unemployment, corruption, and lack of democratic governance in the Niger Delta and Nigeria at large. At the root of these agitations in these communities is the quest for a measure of political autonomy and self-governance – and, by extension, the rectification of historical wrongs, including the loss of substantial oil revenues (Alagoa, 2005)

In an apparent acceptance of the futility of a violent reaction, the late President Umaru Yar'Adua granted amnesty to militants on June 25, 2009, if they turned in their weapons. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is one tactic seen to be helpful in this regard and is being used more frequently in war and post-conflict scenarios Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). Since the UN Observer Group's activities in Central Sudan in 1989, formal initiatives focused on disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating fighters into civil society have grown to be a significant UN intervention tactic (Muggah, 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).

DDR has achieved some level of success in mitigating armed conflict and in sustaining peace in many conflict-ridden or war-ravaged societies, including Rwanda, DR Congo, El Salvador, Cambodia, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Russia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, India, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Burundi, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of its increasingly widespread usage and the successes it has recorded in the areas where it has been applied, the UN Secretary-General concluded that a "process of disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration has repeatedly proven to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation" (United Nations, 2006). This strategy is currently being used in hopes of preventing the Niger Delta conflict from escalating. If the crisis is allowed to escalate into full-blown war, it may become too costly and dangerous to intervene in any form, and intervention after war, in any case, is the least likely to succeed (Annan, 1996).

Research Method

This study adopted a qualitative approach. This is considered most suitable given the nature of the research that requires in-depth information from participants with vast experience in the phenomenon that would be investigated. The qualitative approach allows the interviewees to air their views freely without restriction, giving helpful information that would be of value to the research. Adopting this approach would enable us to identify the most severe threats to the validity and reliability of the topic under study, mainly as they affect these selected local government areas in Delta State. The study employed both the primary and secondary means of data collection. This means that the primary data was sourced from unstructured interviews. The secondary data was sourced from institutional and official documents from organizations such as NDDC, NNPC quarterly reports, and other related documents that concern the research topic. Secondary data sources such as textbooks, journals, magazines, articles, and other written works bordering on the subject were used. It aims to keep the literature up to date with current issues affecting the case study of this research.The purposive sampling method was adopted to select participants based on individual capacity to participate and add value to the study. Respondents from the selected local government areas of Burutu and Warri South-west were selected for in-depth interviewing, including ex-militants, traditional rulers, politicians, and academicians from Delta State University Abraka. The thematic content analysis method was adopted.

Operationalization of Concept

The Concept of Amnesty

Gardner et al. (2009:99, in Fagge and Alabi, 2016:295) define amnesty as a pardon given by the State to a class or group of people, typically for a political offence. It is the formal act of sovereign power to absolve a specific class of people who are being tried but have not yet been found guilty. The government's move grants immunity from prosecution to all individuals or specific groups of individuals who have committed a criminal crime, generally one that is political and endangers the government's sovereignty. Such charges include sedition and treason. Amnesty permits a country's or State's government to "forget" about illegal activity, generally before charges are brought. An act of amnesty is generally granted to a group of people who have committed crimes against the State, such as treason, rebellion, or desertion from the military (Epiphany, 2013). O'Shea (2002) sees amnesty, in the general sense, as a political tool of compromise and reunion granted by a sovereign to individuals who have committed acts against the State,

usually treasonable offences and rebellion. O'Shea defines amnesty as immunity in law from either criminal or civil legal consequences, or both, for wrongs in the past in a political context.

Concept of Militancy

Various definitions have been given to the term militancy. According to Quamruzzaman (2010),"militancy" refers to the behaviors of individuals, parties, or organizations that exhibit or participate in violence, typically in support of a cause that is social, political, religious, or ideological. These days, the terms "terrorist" and "militant" are interchangeable. Ashimolowo and Odiachi (2012) see the motive behind militancy as people wanting their rights. If they do not get it by negotiation, they simply will have it by violence against the "powers that be."A more recent understanding of militants implies that they are forced or voluntary recruits in an organization/militia. Khan (2005) sees militancy as the confrontational act of a group or organization supporting some aggressive cause based on a self-created agenda. Militancy is the portrayal of aggression, and the militant is involved in a belligerent act. Bobbitt (2002) holds that militancy manifests unfulfilled demands created under autocracy and dictatorship, which may otherwise be catered to peacefully under a democratic regime. A militia movement has five dimensions, according to Quamruzzaman (2010): philosophy, motivation, mobilization, organization, and ritual. This term can refer to somebody withfirmly held beliefs (e.g., Militant Atheist, Militant Christian). When a person or organization is militant, they support a cause or idea and act physically aggressively. Regardless of whether they use pacifistic tactics or actual violence, militants are combative.

Militancy in the Niger Delta

One of the leading causes of the unrest in the Niger Delta appears to be the ethnic minority's sense of political oppression. Numerous interviewees' points of view emphasize this. For example, Kowa identifies the ' militia groups" protests and resistance against political tyranny prior to the discovery of oil in Nigeria. He says that this created the conditions for conflicts for political dominance, as minority groups were subject to the regional rule of the Igbo people, who make up the majority in the Eastern area. According to Kowa 2016:

> In the Niger Delta, militancy is a result of many conflicts that stem from the Adaka Boro uprising. Our separation from the Eastern area was necessary due to the unfairness and minority status of the local population. These things happened before oil became widely known. (Kowa (2016).

The Niger Delta region has long been home to militant groups. The government's policies and military activities, together with the purported assistance of the oil majors, have previously repressed it to the bare minimum. Some examples of these actions include the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the NDDC, the Amnesty Programme, JTF operations, and more.

According to Bakut's (2006) historical analysis, the relationship between environmental degradation and conflicts in Africa is evident, given the detrimental effects that African peoples have endured. This perspective aligns with the popular understanding of the relationship between environmental degradation and African crises. While he acknowledges that issues such as pollution, deforestation, global warming, and ozone depletion affect the entire world, he also notes that conflicts within Africa are linked to environmental degradation caused by Multinational Companies (MNCs) exploring or exploiting the continent for resources such as precious stones (as in Liberia and Sierra Leone) or oil (as in the Niger Delta of Nigeria). In particular, in Nigeria, he opines that several environmental degradation-related problems have resulted in flooding. Bakut notes that the conflicts in Plateau and Delta states in Nigeria are about land ownership claims (with the resources found in them). He states that these conflicts are, in essence, over the right to use the environment in pursuit of the socio-economic interest of the people.

Egwemi (2010**)** considers the role of the State in the pervasiveness of conflict in Africa. In looking at the context of conflicts provided by the nature of states in Africa, Egwu notes that the State is also central to the analysis of identity construction and conflicts. He opines that the pervasiveness and domain role of the State explains its central role in the process of identity construction and conflicts. Egwu notes that the politicization of ethnic identity in the construction of power and the organization of the public space in Africa relates to how it is manipulated by the power elites in fragmenting and weakening the opposition. He uses the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to illustrate how the tendency to resort to the ethnic platform to resist the political domination of an overbearing central state authority. However, he notes that the preponderant factor is the tendency for communal conflicts to be fuelled and instigated by the State, which is expected to mediate conflicts. This, he states, is the trend in the Niger Delta, where inter-ethnic and communal conflicts have tended to undermine and weaken the broad coalition of ethnic nationalities in the region in opposition to the predatory activity of the Nigerian State and transnational oil companies. Egwu notes that the strategic role of petroleum in the Nigerian economy, as the primary foreign exchange earner, can explain the desperation to break the resolve of the various ethnic communities. He opines that state involvement in fuelling intra and inter-communal conflicts is critical. Strategy in response of the State to a pattern of domination and exploitation has led to the imposition of the ethnic identity in the Niger Delta. Egwu notes that a shift from liberal to social democracy is necessary to ensure the role of the State in development and also create the ideals of popular participation. He opines that alongside the consolidation of the democratic process is the restoration of constitutional federalism aimed at reducing the concentration of power and resources at the centre.

The first significant episode of violent militancy in the Niger Delta occurred in February1966, on the eve of the succession of

the Eastern Region, or Biafra, which included the eastern oil-producing Delta. Isaac Boro, an Ijaw born in Oloibiri and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), declared the independence of the Niger Delta People's Republic, consisting of the present-day Rivers and Bayelsa States. Boro's abortive twelve-day revolt anticipated the Biafran civil war. Both conflicts were motivated by the control of oil revenue. Boro called for oil companies to negotiate directly with his government rather than with the national authorities. Over a year later, in May 1967, the Eastern Region renamed itself the Republic of Biafra, plunging the country into civil war. In the same month, the federal government broke the East into three states.(Asuni 2009, 5, Barrett 2006, 41).One of them was Rivers State, which included many of the minority groups of the Delta, as well as the bulk of the oil-producing areas. However, any expectations of greater resource control were disappointing, as the federal military government transferred the control of oil resources to itself through legislation both during and after the war (Obi 2004).

Isumonah (2012) holds that the adoption of the violent confrontation by the youth was hastened by the Niger Delta region's youth's visit to Abuja during Abacha's 'two million man match' procession to demonstrate his popularity among Nigerians. The visit of the Niger Delta youths to participate in the procession in Abuja inadvertently exposed them to the reality that they had been severely marginalized and deprived of development. Many of them wondered if they were in Europe. They were surprised that Abuja had attained such development in less than ten years while Niger Delta, the region from where oil is explored to cater for the whole nation, is perpetually impoverished. In late 1998, Ijaw Youth Council convened a meeting of Ijaw youths at Kaiama to discuss the impoverishment of the Niger Delta Region by the FGN and oil companies. In this meeting, the armed struggle for resource control was launched. Already, a series of intra- and inter-communal conflicts and political mobilization of the youths during the election had led to a proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. The youths used these weapons to pursue their war against the Nigerian State. With the exposure to Oil bunkering in the region, the proceeds were also used to procure additional weapons or used in exchange for more sophisticated weapons.

Fagge and Alabi (2016; 296) observe that militants in the Niger Delta consist of both individuals and organizations that have various reasons for fighting against the governments and the oil multinationals. It is important to stress that it is difficult for an individual to function as a militant. It requires a concerted effort and collaboration with individuals with similar beliefs and goals. In this regard, one could state that there are more than ten militant organizations in the Niger Delta.

Observations also revealed that the Niger Delta region is experiencing a paradoxical underdevelopment and poverty amidst plenty. It is because the area is still among Nigeria's least developed, supposedly due to pervasive poverty, despite the region's oil fortune. What keeps the region's militancy

going is a deep-seated sense of marginalization and neglect by the government regarding basic social amenities and human development (Ogege, 2011; UNDP, 2006). In support of this claim, Ndoma-Egba (2004) argues that the region's ongoing unrest and violent crises result from the Nigerian State's failure to meet the region's requirements for development. He claims the Nigerian State's inability to satisfy its fundamental development needs is intentional. The result of a glaring lack of political will on the side of the government leadership fuels the agitation and makes it more forcefully articulated. Essentially, the militants believe that their circumstances are unfair and that they must take up guns to correct them (Smith, 2002).Nigerian government itself acknowledged this as President Umaru Musa Yar'adua noted in the 2009 Independence Day broadcast that the militants took up arms as a way of drawing attention to the plight of the people of the region.

Impact of Presidential Amnesty on the Youths of Burutu and Warri South-west Local Government Areas of Delta State.

According to Ikein (2009), a disconnection between the economic advantage of the Niger Delta and the quantum of resources disbursed for the development of the region has given rise to structural imbalances in Nigeria. Consequently, the Niger Delta of Nigeria is increasingly famous due to massive oil deposits and constant violence in the region. Estimates show that the Nigerian government generates over 90% of its revenue from the region, characterized by a crisis of underdevelopment. The region remains underdeveloped despite its massive revenue for the privileged social class, including public figures, public servants, and beneficiaries from multinational oil corporations. The Nigerian government and multinational corporations are principal beneficiaries of the massive oil deposits in the region. At the same time, the majority of the people there battle against squalor occasioned by exploitative oil exploration, environmental degradation, climate change, inadequate infrastructure, unemployment, and poverty. Actions taken to address this situation are diverse, ranging from state-led efforts and identity-based social movements to interventions in civil society, including the family, schools, and religious organizations.

The study further revealed that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the Niger Delta militants have reduced the rate of criminalities in Delta state, unlike what was obtainable throughout militancy. Respondents who were interviewed maintained that it would be an understatement to say that demobilization and reintegration of the militants in Delta state has not contributed to the reduction of cases of kidnap in the study areas. As a matter of sincerity, the traditional rulers, politicians, and scholars in the study area acknowledged that the spate of kidnapping is no longer a common phenomenon as before the presidential declaration and implementation of amnesty. Relative peace and tranquility exist as people go about their daily businesses without fear of abduction. It is essential to mention that ex-militants also function as security agents by ensuring that criminal activities are not recorded in their locations.

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For example, militant allocation is also one key instrument the government has adopted to reduce kidnapping cases in the study areas. Ex – Militant allocation refers to oil allocations assigned to repentant militants through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to sell and earn some money like other oil marketers; as a way of reducing kidnapping, the government's amnesty programme has contributed to a great extent in that direction because most of the militants who were initially in the business of kidnapping and abduction of expatriates and indigenous workers have stopped such heinous activities. One of the ex-militants confirmed this during the interview session when he said,

> The government has not only introduced the presidential amnesty but has also allowed us to benefit from oil sales through what they call ex-militants allocation. With this, it has been difficult for most of us to return to criminality since our needs and those of other persons are met.

This finding is in agreement with the position of Onukwugha, Eke-Ogiugo, and Okhomina (2014), which State that the amnesty package has helped in the reduction of violent crimes as most youths who were involved in anti-social activities have been integrated into the programme; thereby makes violence unattractive. Such crimes include attacking oil installations, engaging in illegal oil bunkering, and kidnapping of oil workers. It is, of course, a truism that violence has now declined but has not disappeared. To this end, there is no gain saying that amnesty has made a significant impact in addressing the issue of kidnapping in Delta State. According to Amnesty Office, Abuja (2010), the number of disarmed militants in Delta state as of December 2009 stands at 20 female militants and 4,396 male militants, bringing the total number to 4 416 disarmed militants, which has drastically reduced cases of kidnaps in Delta state.

It was also found that presidential amnesty positively impacted the lives of youth in the local government areas studied from 2009 to 2015 and even to date. This finding is in line with the contributions of Akinwale (2010:201-207),Osah and Amakihe (2014:1-7), and Atumah (2015), which State that amnesty is supposed to improve the human capital development of the country, which is at present low. They maintained that the programme had presented an opportunity to build youths' capacity and reintegrate agitating Delta state militants into the mainstream in Nigeria as a confidence-building strategy while gradually addressing the root causes that necessitated the conflict in the first place. As long as the youth in the area are empowered, violence is reduced, thereby making them valuable to themselves, their families, and the communities in general. Thus, many youths, particularly the ex-militants, are now reformed and focused on life.

It also agrees with the position of Olatoke and Olotokunba (2012:26) that the objective of amnesty is not to punish but to choose a path that will yield the best possible scenario for the triumph of peace. Thus, amnesty emphasizes the supremacy and expediency of

a conducive atmosphere in promoting public welfare rather than prosecution. They further stated that in Nigeria's post-colonial experience, it has deployed the tool of amnesty on two occasions. The first was in connection with the Nigerian civil war. At the war's end in 1970, the federal government declared the war's outcome "no victor, no vanquished." This general amnesty served the purpose of closing the unfortunate chapter in which the war opened. Also, Ukaogo (2010) stated that amnesty and pardon consist of penalty cancelation for the perpetrator of the criminal act granted by the appropriate records brought into decision by the highest governmental bodies and the youths of the study areas and Niger Delta as a whole were pardoned and rewarded with welfare packages.

Despite the lack of precise data regarding the distribution of beneficiaries under the reintegration programme in terms of their local government area of origin for formal and informal education training, it is essential to note that some of the most prestigious and expensive universities in the world are providing this education to demobilized combatants and youth from Delta State and the Niger Delta. A few of the UK's universities are Kings College, Portsmouth, Salford, Bradford, University of Liverpool, University of Reading, University of Newcastle, University of Dundee, University of Kent, University of Newcastle, Coventry, and more. High-profile universities in Malaysia, Dubai, and Sweden are among the other universities (Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Amnesty 2014).

It cannot be disputed that a graduate from any of these universities has better prospects for job and economic independence than reintegrated combatants in other parts of Africa.The high-quality training acquired by the beneficiaries of the reintegration programme from these study areas is, of course, providing good employment opportunities for them, according to the (Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Amnesty 2014).

Below is the breakdown of beneficiaries of the presidential amnesty programme in the two local government areas under review.

Number of Beneficiaries of Amnesty from 2009 to 2015

Local Government	Number of Beneficiaries
Warri South-west	49
Burutu	50

Source: OSAPA, 2014

Conclusion and Suggestions

This research provided a thorough explanation of the effects of the Presidential Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta, using Delta State as a case study. Since the end of the civil war in 1970, militancy has been Nigeria's most significant security issue until the rise of the Boko Haram Terrorist Organization in the country's northeast. The State's primary reliance on repression and the military option to handle these challenges to its legitimacy resulted in the radicalization of

violent non-state actors, even if they began as simple agitations due to bad governance.

Oil spills and gas flaring, as well as general underdevelopment, continue to be significant problems in some areas of the study areas in the Warri South-West and Burutu local government areas of the Delta state of Nigeria, where the multinational oil companies (MNCs) are responsible for conducting the nation's oil exploration activities. With the strong cooperation of the oil multinational corporations, the country's previous administrations not only ignored the people's plight but also occasionally responded to it with crackdowns and repression against several non-governmental organizations that called attention to the region.

The crisis escalated when the locals began using self-defense tactics to bomb, kidnap, and abduct foreign workers and other staff members of the oil multinational corporations in return for cash ransom. The government created the amnesty scheme in 2009 as a way out of the mess since it could not handle the humiliation and daily decline in oil output and the significant loss of income. Some fundamental problems that first gave rise to militancy remain very much in the public eye, even though disarmament increased oil output and government revenue. Unquestionably, the amnesty programme has helped a lot of former militants and is primarily responsible for the decline in crime and criminalities. However, the government needs to do more to develop infrastructure and ensure that young people are empowered and gainfully employed to contribute to society and themselves. It is the only way to ensure that militants and their activities will become history.

The following suggestions are made:

i. The Amnesty Programme skill acquisition packages promise a better future for the local populations and the companies if well managed. Once ex-militants have received training in oil-related skills, the firms should ensure that these individuals are hired and involved in the industry by setting aside a portion of the employment quota for local residents. It will help the locals become more identified with the businesses that operate in the area.

ii. The government must ensure the inclusion of other militant groups in Delta state that now desire to join in the Amnesty programme. A few militants, primarily young people in the State, have expressed dissatisfaction, claiming that the administration did not show them honesty or trust when they offered them amnesty and that they did not take advantage of this window of opportunity.

iii. It is an old maxim that violence cannot be violence. Militarizing the State with combat-ready armoured personnel carriers, police helicopters, members of the Joint Task Force, and the like will only help to infuriate both the genuine freedom fighters and the criminal elements in the struggle. The result will be a vicious circle of violence begetting violence.

iv. The cooperation of state and local governments, oil malls, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and other intervention agencies is necessary for the Amnesty package to be successful. Every one of these governmental levels, businesses, and organisations has to make an effort to do their share to ensure that the initiative is successful, particularly in training and skill development.

v. The supply of infrastructure facilities should lead to the quick growth of Delta State, particularly the study areas, which are the communities that produce oil. It is time to apply the straightforward strategy that Abuja utilised to expand rapidly to the Niger Delta, particularly the study areas.

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